Show Me Where Congress Passed a Law Regarding Income Tax


M

Money

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cptbanjo@aol

**>> Only government "employees" are paid "wages".**


*False. You are misreading the definition of the term "includes".*

A "TERM" is a custom defined word.

TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Subtitle C - Employment Taxes
CHAPTER 24 - COLLECTION OF INCOME TAX AT SOURCE ON WAGES
Sec. 3401. Definitions

(c) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer,
employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee"
also includes an officer of a corporation.


in·clude tr.v. in·clud·ed, in·clud·ing, in·cludes. 1. To take in as a part,
an element, or a member. 2. To contain as a secondary or subordinate
element. 3. To consider with or place into a group, class, or total: thanked
the host for including us. [Middle English includen, from Latin inclu-dere,
to enclose : in-, in; see IN-2 + claudere, to close.]

Please note the original Latin: To include is to enclose.

en·close also in·close -- tr.v. en·closed, en·clos·ing, en·clos·es. 1. To
surround on all sides; close in. 2. To fence in SO AS TO PREVENT COMMON USE:
enclosed the pasture. [Middle English enclosen, from Old French enclos, past
participle of enclore, from Latin inclu-dere, to enclose. See INCLUDE.]

To include is to enclose; to surround; to contain within. If something is
enclosed, the enclosure has an inside and an outside. An item is either
inside the enclosure or an item is outside the enclosure. One or the other.
There is no third location.

This "enclosure" can be a corral which "encloses" a CLASS of items intended.
Or this "enclosure" can be a corral which "encloses" a LIST of items
intended. Or this "enclosure" can be a corral which "encloses" a LIST of
items intended and a CLASS of items intended.

This sets the stage for the following study and examination of the nature of
limitation or expansion as the case may be for the words includes and
including.

The question to be answered is where does any particular item reside. Does a
particular item reside within the corral of items, or does the item reside
outside the corral of items?

Internal Revenue Code
Section 7701(c) Includes and including

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in
this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of the TERM defined.

Please take note what 7701(c) does NOT state:

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in
this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of the COMMON LANGUAGE (dictionary) definition of the WORD.

I'm going to distill IRC section 7701(c) by removing what is extraneous to
this discussion. This leaves the essence of the concept to be more readily
observed.

Internal Revenue Code
Section 7701(c) Includes and including

THE TERMS "INCLUDES" AND "INCLUDING" when used in a definition contained in
this title SHALL NOT be deemed to EXCLUDE OTHER THINGS otherwise WITHING THE
MEANING OF THE TERM DEFINED.

Section 7701(c) parse:
THE TERMS "INCLUDES" AND "INCLUDING" --- SHALL NOT --- EXCLUDE OTHER
THINGS --- WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERM DEFINED.

Only when the "TERM DEFINED" is a CLASS of items can includes and including
be expansive... And then, only in regard to items within the CLASS defined.

Section 7701(c) parse:
THE TERMS "INCLUDES" AND "INCLUDING" --- SHALL NOT --- EXCLUDE OTHER
THINGS --- WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE TERM DEFINED.

Congress codified the following rule of statutory construction in
section 7701(c):

Ejusdem generis
(eh-youse-dem generous) v adj. Latin for "of the same kind," used to
interpret loosely written statutes. WHERE A LAW LISTS SPECIFIC CLASSES OF
PERSONS OR THINGS AND THEN REFERS TO THEM IN GENERAL, THE GENERAL STATEMENTS
ONLY APPLY TO THE SAME KIND OF PERSONS OR THINGS SPECIFICALLY LISTED.
Example: if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and
other motor-powered vehicles, "vehicles" would not include airplanes, since
the list was of land-based transportation.

ONLY when defining a CLASS can items be included (enclosed) in that class
without specific enumeration. Then, and ONLY then, can the use of includes
and including be expansive in nature. And the expansion can only expand to
"enclose" items of the SAME CLASS. It does NOT "enclose" items not in the
same class. Thus even as a term of expansion, includes and including are
terms of LIMITED expansion.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
One of the linguistic canons applicable to the construction of legislation.
By expressing one thing is [by implication] to exclude another. THERE IS NO
ROOM FOR THE APPLICATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE WHERE SOME REASON OTHER THAN THE
INTENTION TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN ITEMS EXISTS for the express mention in
question. THUS WHAT IS SAID MAY BE INTENDED MERELY AS AN EXAMPLE or be
included for abundance of caution or for some other reason; or the thing
supposed to have been impliedly excluded may not have existed at the passing
of the enactment.

The above rule of statutory construction acknowledges the prior rule of
statutory construction. What is said may be intended as an example, and as
the prior rule observes, A partial LIST MAY BE AN EXAMPLE OF A CLASS OF
ITEMS.

HOWEVER, that is not the case when the corral "ENCLOSES" a specific list of
items.

"Designatio unius est exclusio alterius, et expressum facit cessare tacitum:
The designation of one is the exclusion of the other; and what is expressed
prevails over what is implied."
Black's 7th edition.

Thus the TERM defined can be the name of a CLASS of items OR the name of a
LIST of items. Thus in the one case the term is a term of LIMITED expansion,
and the other, the term is a term of LIMITATION.

Internal Revenue Code
Sec. 3401. Definitions

(c) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer,
employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.

The corral "encloses" a CLASS. The CLASS is defined by the list of items in
the first sentence. The first sentence DOES NOT enclose any item other than
a government paid worker.

The term "employee" includes; (encloses; corrals);

* an officer of the United States;
* an employee of the United States;
* an elected official of the United States;
* an officer of the District of Columbia;
* an employee of the District of Columbia;
* an elected official of the District of Columbia;
* an officer of a political subdivision of the United States;
* an employee of a political subdivision of the United States;
* an elected official of a political subdivision of the United States;
* an officer of a political subdivision of the District of Columbia;
* an employee of a political subdivision of the District of Columbia;
* an elected official of a political subdivision of the District of
Columbia;
* an officer of a corporation.


Internal Revenue Code
Sec. 3401. Definitions

(c) Employee
The term "EMPLOYEE" also includes an officer of a corporation.

In the second sentence, the use of includes is in the capacity of a plus
sign. It ADDS an item to the previously defined CLASS.

Info on a "corporation" to consider in regard to "an officer of a
corporation": 28 USC Sec. 3002. Definitions As used in this chapter: (15)
"United States" means - (A) a Federal corporation; (B) an agency,
department, commission, board, or other entity of the United States; or (C)
an instrumentality of the United States.

If the dictionary definition ruled, there would be no need to define
employee as including an employee of the United States, a State, or any
political subdivision thereof... Since such a government employee is already
contained within the dictionary definition of employee.


Let us apply the section 7701(c) parse to the statutory definition of an
employee shown in IRC 3401.

The terms "includes" and "including" shall not exclude other things within
the meaning of the term defined.

The term defined is a CLASS of items.

The terms "includes" and "including" shall not exclude other things within
the meaning of the CLASS defined.

That CLASS is government employees.

The terms "includes" and "including" shall not exclude other things within
the meaning of the GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES defined.

The things required to NOT be excluded are other government workers.

The terms "includes" and "including" shall not exclude OTHER GOVERNMENT
WORKERS within the meaning of the GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES defined.

Internal Revenue Code
Sec. 3401. Definitions

(c) Employee
For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer,
employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.

"In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule
not to extend their provisions by implication beyond the clear import of the
language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to embrace matters not so
specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly
against the government and in favor of the citizen."
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917)

* It is the established rule not to extend taxing statutes by
implication.
* It is the established rule not to extend taxing statutes beyond the
clear language used.
* It is the established rule not to embrace matters not so specifically
pointed out in the taxing statutes.

If includes and including is always expansive, then why does section 61
state:

.... gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) the following items:



TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Subtitle F - Procedure and Administration
CHAPTER 75 - CRIMES, OTHER OFFENSES, AND FORFEITURES
Subchapter D - Miscellaneous Penalty and Forfeiture Provisions
Sec. 7343. Definition of term "person"

The term "person" as used in this chapter includes an officer or employee of
a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such
officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect
of which the violation occurs.

The [statutory] term "person" as used in this chapter---

The "person" named by statute, to which the chapter 75 penalty statutes
apply, are:

* An officer of a corporation who AS SUCH officer is under a duty to
perform the required act;
* An employee of a corporation who AS SUCH employee is under a duty to
perform the required act;
* A member of a partnership who AS SUCH partner is under a duty to
perform the required act;
* An employee of a partnership who AS SUCH employee is under a duty to
perform the required act.


Do you see an individual in their private capacity? Do you see an
individual NOT in their capacity as an officer, partner, or employee?

To argue that includes is a word of expansion is to argue that the term
expands to include individuals that are already contained within the generic
meaning of the word "person". If the generic meaning of the word person is
meant, there would be no need for expansion.

If officers, partners, and employees are NOT persons until IRC section 7343
activates, then neither are you and I. And if it takes the activation of
this IRC section to bring the listed officers, partners, and employees
within the term person, it will likewise take the activation of a statute to
just as specifically bring you and I within the term.

The root word of includes means to enclose. Much like the fence of a corral
includes (encloses) the herd of horses, the term "person" includes
(encloses) the specific officers, partners, and employees listed. Unless
used with supporting words such as "includes but is not limited to" or "also
includes", the term includes is a word of limitation.


**>> Private workers working for private companies do NOT receive wages as
statutorily defined...**


*Yes, they do.*

LOL.


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cptbanjo@aol



*Wrong. The gift tax, for example, is an excise tax, and in upholding its
constitutionality the Supreme Court stated,*

*"Whatever may be the precise line which sets off direct taxes from others,
we need not now determine. While taxes levied upon or collected from persons
because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct,
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Turst Co., this court has consistently held,
almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a
particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property
incidental to ownership, is an excise which neet not be apportioned, and it
is enough for present purposes that this tax is of the latter class."
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).*

Interesting case, Thank you for bringing it to my attention.

"Bromley, a resident of the United States ---"

If Bromley is a "resident" he is NOT a Citizen.

"The questions certified are:

1. Are the provisions of sections 319-324 of the Revenue Act of 1924, as
amended by section 324 of the Revenue Act of 1926, when applied to transfers
of property by gift inter vivos, made after the effective dates of the cited
Revenue Acts and not made in contemplation of death, invalid, because they
violate (a) the third clause of section 2 and (b) the fourth clause of
section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution in that the tax they impose is a
direct tax and has not been apportioned?"

"inter vivos": During the life of. Usually referred to in probate or in
trust or other transfers. An inter-vivos gift is thus a gift made while
someone is alive. An inter-vivos trust is more commonly known as a living
trust.

"1. The first question was mooted by counsel, but not decided in Blodgett v.
Holden, 275 U.S. 142 , 48 S. Ct. 105, and Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S.
440 , 48 S. Ct. 353. The general power to 'lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises' conferred by article 1, 8, of the Constitution, and
required by that section to be uniform throughout the United States, is
limited by section 2 of the same article, which requires 'direct' taxes to
be apportioned, and section 9, which provides that 'no capitation, or other
direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census' directed by
the Constitution to be taken. As the present tax is not apportioned, it is
forbidden, if direct."

Court just confirmed, direct taxes MUST be apportioned.

The court then states the text you cited above, followed by this interesting
text:

"It is a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those powers
incident to ownership, the power to give the property owned to another.
Under this statute all the other rights and powers which collectively
constitute property or ownership may be fully enjoyed free of the tax. So
far as the constitutional power to tax is concerned, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO STATE ANY INTELLIGIBLE DISTINCTION, founded either in reason or upon
practical considerations of weight, BETWEEN A TAX UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER TO GIVE PROPERTY INTER VIVOS AND THE DISPOSITION OF IT BY LEGACY,
upheld in Knowlton v. Moore, ---"

"Legacy": Money or property bequeathed to another by will.
"Eo nomine": In that name.

Let us take a moment to examine some text from Knowlton v. Moore:

"TAXES OF THIS general CHARACTER are universally deemed to RELATE, NOT TO
PROPERTY EO NOMINE, BUT TO ITS PASSAGE BY WILL OR BY DESCENT in cases of
intestacy, AS DISTINGUISTED FROM TAXES IMPOSED ON PROPERTY, real or
personal, as such, BECAUSE OF ITS OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION. In other words,
the public contribution which DEATH DUTIES exact IS PREDICATED ON THE
PASSING OF PROPERTY AS THE RESULT OF DEATH, as DISTINCT FROM A TAX ON
PROPERTY DISASSOCIATED FROM ITS TRANSMISSION or receipt by will, or as the
result of intestacy. Such taxes so considered were known to the Roman law
and the ancient law of the continent of Europe, 3 Smith, Wealth of Nations,
London ed. 1811, p. 311. Continuing the rule of the ancient French law, at
the present day in France inheritance and legacy taxes are enforced, being
collectible as stamp duties. THEY ARE INCLUDED officially UNDER THE general
DENOMINATION OF INDIRECT TAXES, FOR THE REASON THAT ALL INHERITANCE TAXES
ARE CONSIDERED AS LEVIED ON THE 'OCCASION OF A PARTICULAR ISOLATED ACT.'
This view of the inheritance and legacy tax conforms to the official
definition of indirect taxes, among which inheritance and legacy taxes are
classed, which prevails in France at the present day. The definition is as
follows:

'DIRECT TAXES BEAR IMMEDIATELY UPON PERSONS, UPON THE POSSESSION AND
ENJOYMENTS OF RIGHTS; indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an
event or an exchange.' "

Parse:
"IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO STATE ANY INTELLIGIBLE DISTINCTION --- BETWEEN A
TAX UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO GIVE PROPERTY INTER VIVOS AND THE
DISPOSITION OF IT BY LEGACY"

"TAXES OF THIS --- CHARACTER --- RELATE, NOT TO PROPERTY EO NOMINE (in that
name), BUT TO ITS PASSAGE BY WILL OR BY DESCENT --- AS DISTINGUISTED FROM
TAXES IMPOSED ON PROPERTY --- BECAUSE OF ITS OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION."

"--- DEATH DUTIES --- [ARE] PREDICATED ON THE PASSING OF PROPERTY AS THE
RESULT OF DEATH, --- DISTINCT FROM A TAX ON PROPERTY DISASSOCIATED FROM ITS
TRANSMISSION"

"THEY ARE INCLUDED --- UNDER THE --- DENOMINATION OF INDIRECT TAXES, FOR THE
REASON THAT ALL INHERITANCE TAXES ARE CONSIDERED AS LEVIED ON THE 'OCCASION
OF A PARTICULAR ISOLATED ACT"

"DIRECT TAXES BEAR IMMEDIATELY UPON PERSONS, UPON THE POSSESSION AND
ENJOYMENTS OF RIGHTS ---"

Returning to some more interesting passages of the Bromley v. McCaughn case:

"It is true that in each of these cases the tax was imposed upon the
exercise of one of the numerous rights of property, but each is clearly
distinguishable from a tax which falls upon the owner merely because he is
owner, regardless of the use of disposition made of his property.
---
It is said that, since PROPERTY IS THE SUM OF ALL THE RIGHTS AND POWERS
INCIDENT TO OWNERSHIP, 173 U. S., 19 S. Ct. 522. f any of them is upheld,
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND OTHER CLASSES OF TAXES MAY BE WIPED OUT,
SINCE PROPERTY ITSELF MAY LIKEWISE BE TAXED BY RESORT TO THE EXPEDIENT OF
LEVYING NUMEROUS TAXES UPON ITS USES; that ONE OF THE USES OF PROPERTY IS TO
KEEP IT, and that A TAX UPON THE POSSESSION OF KEEPING OF PROPERTY IS NO
DIFFERENT FROM A TAX ON THE PROPERTY ITSELF. EVEN IF WE ASSUME THAT A TAX
LEVIED UPON ALL THE USES TO WHICH PROPERTY MAY BE PUT, OR UPON THE EXERCISE
OF A SINGLE POWER INDESPENSABLE TO THE ENJOYMENT OF ALL OTHERS OVER IT,
WOULD BE in effect A TAX UPON PROPERTY, see Dawson v. Kentucky Distilling &
Warehouse Co., 255 U.S. 288 , 41 S. Ct. 272, and hence a direct tax
requiring apportionment, THAT IS NOT THE CASE BEFORE US."

Parse:
"PROPERTY IS THE SUM OF ALL THE RIGHTS AND POWERS INCIDENT TO OWNERSHIP"

"THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIRECT AND OTHER CLASSES OF TAXES MAY BE WIPED OUT,
SINCE PROPERTY ITSELF MAY LIKEWISE BE TAXED BY RESORT TO THE EXPEDIENT OF
LEVYING NUMEROUS TAXES UPON ITS USES"

"ONE OF THE USES OF PROPERTY IS TO KEEP IT --- A TAX UPON THE POSSESSION OF
KEEPING OF PROPERTY IS NO DIFFERENT FROM A TAX ON THE PROPERTY ITSELF. "

"EVEN IF WE ASSUME THAT A TAX LEVIED UPON ALL THE USES TO WHICH PROPERTY MAY
BE PUT, OR UPON THE EXERCISE OF A SINGLE POWER INDESPENSABLE TO THE
ENJOYMENT OF ALL OTHERS OVER IT, WOULD BE --- A TAX UPON PROPERTY, --- THAT
IS NOT THE CASE BEFORE US."

Returning again to the Bromley v. McCaughn case:

"--- the present levy falls so far short of taxing generally the uses of
property that it cannot be likened to the taxes on property itself which
have been recognized as direct. It falls, rather, into that category of
imposts or excises which, since they apply only to a LIMITED exercise of
property rights, have been deemed to be indirect and so valid, although not
apportioned."

Key word: LIMITED.

Much like the First Amendment does not protect yelling FIRE! in a movie
theater and is thus LIMITED.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND (dissenting).
"The right to give away one's property is as fundamental as the right to
sell it or, indeed, to possess it. To give away property is not to exercise
a separate element or incident of ownership, like the use of a carriage, but
completely to sever the donor's relation to the property and leave in him no
element or incident of ownership whatsoever. Reasonably it cannot be doubted
that the power to dispose of property according to the will of the owner is
a property right. If a tax upon the sale of property, irrespective of
special circumstances, is a direct tax, it is clear that a tax upon the gift
of property, irrespective of special circumstances, is, likewise, direct."

Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 , 19 S. Ct. 522, it not to the contrary of these
cases, but in complete accord with them. There it was held that a tax levied
upon a sale of property effected at a board of trade or exchange was an
excise laid upon the privilege, opportunity, or facility afforded by boards
of trade or exchanges for the transaction of the business and not upon the
property or the sale thereof, which, it was conceded, would be a direct tax
and void without apportionment. Brief quotations from the opinion will make
the distinction clear. Referring to the cases which had been cited against
the tax, including Brown v. Maryland, supra, and the Pollock Case, it was
said that all these cases involved the question whether the taxes assailed
were in effect taxes upon property and (page 519 of 173 U. S., 19 S. Ct.
526): 'If this tax is not on the property, or on the sale thereof, then
these cases do not apply.' At page 520 of 173 U. S., 19 S. Ct. 527,
answering the contention that the tax was one on the property sold, it was
said: It is not laid upon the property at all, nor upon the profits of the
sale thereof, nor upon the sale itself, considered separate and apart from
the place and the circumstances of the sale.' And finally, at page 521 of
173 U. S., 19 S. Ct. 527, the court said in words that admit of no mistake:
'A tax upon the privilege of selling property at the exchange, and of thus
using the facilities there offered in accomplishing the sale, differs
radically from a tax upon every sale made in any place. The latter tax is
really and practically upon property. It takes no notice of any kind of
privilege or facility, and the fact of a sale is alone regarded.'

To me it seems plain that a tax imposed upon an ordinary gift, to be
measured by the value of the property [280 U.S. 124, 142] given and
without regard to any qualifying circumstances, is a tax by indirection upon
the property, as much, for example, as a tax upon the mere possession by the
owner of a farm, measured by the value of the land possessed, would be a tax
on the land. To call either of them an excise is to sacrifice substance to a
mere form of words. I think, therefore, the first question certified,
without stopping to consider the second, should be answered in the
affirmative.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER and Mr. Justice BUTLER concur in this opinion.


Government and law exist for three reasons, and three reasons only:
To protect LIFE
To protect LIBERTY
To protect PROPERTY.

YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 U.S. 356 (1886):
"When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of
government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review
the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they
do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power. SOVEREIGNTY ITSELF IS, OF COURSE, NOT SUBJECT TO LAW, FOR
IT IS THE AUTHOR AND SOURCE OF LAW; but in our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself
remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and
acts. And THE LAW IS THE DEFINITION AND LIMITATION OF POWER. It is, indeed,
quite true that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some person or
body, the authority of final decision; and in many cases of mere
administration, the responsibility is purely political, no appeal lying
except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in
the pressure of opinion, or by means of the suffrage. But THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS, CONSIDERED AS
INDIVIDUAL POSSESSIONS, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and
equal laws, so that, in the famous language of the Massachusetts bill of
rights, the government of the commonwealth 'may be a government of laws and
not of men.' FOR THE VERY IDEA THAT ONE MAN MAY BE COMPELLED TO HOLD HIS
life, or the means of living, or any MATERIAL RIGHT ESSENTIAL TO THE
ENJOYMENT OF LIFE, AT THE MERE WILL OF ANOTHER, SEEMS TO BE intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails, as being THE ESSENCE OF SLAVERY ITSELF."

*your moronic argument*
Your admission that you don't have the requisite skills to debate
intelligently is noted.

*So unless you're prepared to argue that the exercise of a single power over
property is a privileged activity, and to explain why it is, you'd better
abandon your moronic argument about excises necessarily involving
privileges.*

The court is wrong in the case you cited for the same reason the court is
wrong in the recent Kelo case.
Government and law exist for three reasons, and three reasons only:
To protect LIFE
To protect LIBERTY
To protect PROPERTY.


Even if you and the court were correct on this issue, you still need to
state what "right incident to property ownership" is being taxed by the
income "excise" tax.

Name the "right incident to property ownership" is being taxed by the income
"excise" tax.
"______________________________________________"


As to defending my argument, it's simple, You and/or the IRS will have to
kill me to take my property with an unapportioned direct tax that is not
upon privilege.

Replacing what you snipped:

Here's the Cook's summary of Pollock:
In particular, a tax imposed on the income derived from employment is an
excise tax levied on the "privilege" of exercising the particular profession
from which the income was derived.

Page 2580 of the House Congressional Record dated March 27, 1943:
The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.

*For Constitutional purposes, it is an indirect tax, in the manner of an
excise [PRIVILEGE] tax, insofar as it is levied on wages and salaries.*

Name the privilege.
"______________________________________________"


*And you fail to realize that the definition used wasn't limited to
corporate income.*
Wrong. I do NOT fail to realize what the definition is.
You need to go back and re-read the ENTIRE post you replied to.

Since you can go back, I'll not repost that text here.

EXCISE.



*Instead of cuting and pasting, why don't you explain why the ownership and
management of investment property involves a privilege*
I don't need to.


*(Btw, the stuff you cited said "activity OR privilege", thereby indicating
that a privilege isn't always required. Thanks for destroying your own
argument.)*

It's PRIVILEGED activity or PRIVILEGE. Go back and read it again, and read
the rest of the post also.



*Hopelessly wrong.*
Just because you say so, don't make it so.

*A tax on personal earning has never been held to be a direct tax, and no
court has ever held that an excise tax must involve a privilege.*
Here's the Cook's summary of Pollock:
In particular, a tax imposed on the income derived from employment is an
excise tax levied on the "privilege" of exercising the particular profession
from which the income was derived.

Payroll is the exchange of labor (Property per the S.C.) for money (a form
of property) or other property. Payroll is not income unless it results
from PRIVILEGE. Otherwise it is an exchange of property for like valued
property. And exchanging labor for property is an UNALIENABLE right.

*And the only way you can prove me wrong is to cite a case in which someone
who wasn't involved in a privileged activity escaped having his income taxed
on that basis. In the meantime, your endless parrotting of the dictum in
the Wallace case shows how pathetically asinine your position is.*

That's not the only way. I can post questions with self-evident answers.

Is taking of property of a natural person against that person's will and
without that person's permission THEFT?
Is a purpose of government to protect property and rights to property?
If a government that is supposed to protect property and rights to property
in stead TAKES the property of a natural person against that person's will
and without that person's permission, is that government violating its
purpose?

You're a true believer in the goodness of government. Just like the German
truck driver delivering Zyklon-B to the camps.
Go check out this guy's web site:
http://www.synapticsparks.info/primer1/contents.html

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esenter@comcast






*That all depends on what you mean by "direct-unapportioned tax".*

I mean the assertion made by Brushaber: "the conclusion that the 16th
Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation; that is, a
power to levy an income tax which, although direct, should not be subject to
the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. "

I mean the assertion made by Stanton: "the tax levied --- what was deemed to
be the peculiar direct tax which the 16th Amendment exceptionally authorized
to be levied without apportionment,"
*Well, you have a problem. What the court meant was that the 16th Amendment
did not allow an UNAPPORTIONED DIRECT TAX. That is not the same as saying a
"direct-unapportioned tax".*

LOL. Okay. If you say so. Your statement stands on its own, naked for the
world to see it, and so do you.

I did read your post in the google archives where you argued that "taxable
income isn't taxable".

*All direct taxes must be apportioned. That is a true statement.*
Yes. We agree on this.

*But, whether or not a direct-unapportioned tax is a direct tax that must be
apportioned depends entirely upon the object which the tax directly
operates.*
But on this, you CONTRADICT YOURSELF. I need say nothing more.
*That is again your problem. It is not a contradiction. The distinction is
whether "direct" is being used as an adverb or is being used as part of a
noun - 'direct tax'. You see, 'direct tax' is a species of tax of
constitutional purpose. 'Direct taxes' must be apportioned. Whereas,
'direct-unapportioned tax' is indicating some unapportioned tax which
directly operates upon some object.

That distinction is probably over your head and is why you are so confused.*

LOL.

Direct tax = apportioned tax = Constitutionally legal.

Direct-unapportioned tax = direct tax, unapportioned = UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Muddy the waters if you must. People can still see you for what YOU are.

It doesn't matter to me if you want to pretend to be so ignorant... Other
that I won't tolerate much of it before I begin to ignore you.
*Taxes laid upon land or people are direct taxes. Taxes laid upon income
are indirect taxes.*

A tax laid on income is a DIRECT TAX that IS subject to the rule of
apportionment. The INCOME can NOT be the nexus, since direct taxes MUST BE
APPORTIONED. Therefore the ONLY way to tax "income", is to tax a privileged
nexus, MEASURED by the income. That is why an "income" tax is an "excise"
(privilege) tax.
*Sorry, but since the 16th Amendment as explained by Brushaber, NO tax laid
on INCOME is a direct tax. ALL income taxes are hence categorized as
'excises, duties or imposts'.*

Just because you say so, doesn't make it so.

http://groups.google.com/group/can.taxes/msg/167a9b30b861c2fa?hl=en

American Airways v. Wallace, 57 F.2d 877, 880:
The term 'excise tax' and 'privilege tax' are synonymous. The two are often
used interchangeably.

Here's the Cook's summary of Pollock:
In particular, a tax imposed on the income derived from employment is an
excise tax levied on the "privilege" of exercising the particular profession
from which the income was derived.

Page 2580 of the House Congressional Record dated March 27, 1943:
The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.
Did you know that EVERYTHING said in Congress is recorded in the
congressional record? That means both the winning and losing arguments.
You have just quoted the losing argument.

What I just quoted is what the guy that worked on writing the tax law said.
*If the income tax is an excise tax like you said, what does it matter what
an excise tax is? *

A fair question.

Answer: If the income tax does not have the proper traits, it is NOT an
excise tax. The properties of what an excise tax is, determines what taxes
are to be allowed inside that category. If the income tax does not have the
properties of an excise tax, then that income tax is NOT an excise tax.

*Then you did not mean to say, "the income tax is an excise tax".*

If the income tax is not an excise tax, then it is a direct tax on the
property of the income itself and would not be Constitutional. That is NOT
the case, therefore, the "income" tax IS an excise tax just like the drafter
of the tax law said:
Page 2580 of the House Congressional Record dated March 27, 1943:
The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.

Now add to the page 2580 cite, this cite from the Eisner case:
"The question is one of definition, and the answer to it may be found in
recent decisions of this Court.

The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 11, 112), was not
an income tax law, but a definition of the word 'income' was so necessary in
its administration that in an early case it was formulated as 'A gain
derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.'
---
there would seem to be no room to doubt that the word must be given the same
meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was given to it in
the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that meaning is has now become
definitely settled by decisions of this Court.

The meaning of income in the 1909 tax act was corporate profit. This is
definitively and unassailably nailed down by the Flint v. Stone; Stratton's
Independence v. Howbert; and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. cases. It is not until
the later cases that the definition of income is expanded.

The 1909 EXCISE tax act was a tax on the PRIVILEGE of doing business in the
corporate form.
Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107 (1911):
"These cases involve the constitutional validity of 38 of the act of
Congress approved August 5, 1909, known as 'the corporation tax' law.

n this statute the intention is expressly declared to impose a special
excise tax with respect to the carrying on or doing business by such
corporation, joint stock company or association, or company. It is therefore
apparent ... that the tax is imposed ... upon the doing of corporate or
insurance business, and with respect to the carrying on thereof, ...

[W]hen imposed in this manner it is a tax upon the doing of business, with
the advantages which inhere in the peculiarities of corporate or joint stock
organization of the character described. As the latter organizations share
many benefits of corporate organization, it may be described generally as a
tax upon the doing of business in a corporate capacity.

In other words, the tax is imposed upon the doing of business of the
character described, and the measure of the tax is to be income, with the
deduction stated, received not only from property used in business, but from
every source. "

Page 2580 again, with additional text:

*2580*
the making and holding of investments, while perhaps not technically a
business, is, at least, a kind of activity or privilege which can properly
be subjected to an excise tax measured by reference to the income derived
therefrom.

A "Return on Investment" tax - "a tax based on income from
property". Returns on investment is a privilege, thus a tax on such
privilege is an "excise" (privilege) tax.

*2580*
That investment income may be included as a part of the basis for measuring
an excise tax was recognized by Congress in the act of August 5, 1909. This
act provided, "That every corporation * * * shall be subject to pay annually
a special excise tax with respect to the carrying on of doing business by
such corporation, * * * equivalent to a 1 percent upon the entire net income
over and above $5,000 received by it from all sources during such year,
exclusive of amounts received by it as dividends upon stock and other
corporations * * * subject to the tax hereby imposed; * * *." Certain
corporations, such as religious, charitable, and educational organizations,
etc., were specifically exempted from the tax.

The tax imposed by this act was really an income tax in that it was based
upon net income, but was given the correct designation of "excise tax". It
was imposed with respect to carrying on or doing business; and it should be
noted that the basis was net income from all sources, except dividends from
other corporations subject to the tax. Such dividends were excepted not
because they constituted investment income but because they represented
income which had already been taxed. The sole test of taxability under this
act was whether a corporation was engaged in business. If it was so
engaged, then all the income (except dividends), including investment
income, was used in measuring the tax. The Supreme Court held that the fact
that the tax was measured by net income, and that income from nontaxable
property or property not used in business was included in computing net
income, did not prevent the tax from being construed as an excise tax which
did not require apportionment. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. et al. (1911)

*COMMENT*
"The sole test of taxability under this act was whether a corporation was
engaged in business" which is what an examination of the Flint v. Stone
Tracy, Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert, and Doyle v. Mitchell Bros
cases show.

*2580*
So far as the objections raised in the Pollock case are concerned, the
principle applied to corporations under the act of 1909 with the approval of
the Supreme Court might have been extended to individuals engaged in
business. In that way investment income of individuals as well as
corporations could doubtless have been brought under the terms of the act.
And the field of income could have been completely covered by applying the
principle that ownership and management of investment property is an
activity or privilege with respect to which Congress may impose an excise.

"Investment income". Return on investment. Gain or profit from
invested property.

*2580*
However that may be, Congress chose to remove all doubt by an amendment to
the Constitution. The resolution embodying the proposed amendment was
deposited in the Department of State on July 31, 1909, a few days before the
act of 1909 was approved by the President. The amendment was duly ratified
and became effective as the sixteenth amendment on February 25, 1913.

The 1894 Tax Act attempted to tax returns on investment. In the Pollock v.
Farmer's Trust case, the Supreme Court in effect, said that to tax the
return on investment is the same as to tax the investment and such a tax is
a Direct Tax, and the tax in question was not laid according to the rule of
apportionment. This was the error made in the Pollock decision.

Whether the amendment was duly ratified is questionable. THE LAW THAT NEVER
WAS is a book written by a person that is alleged to have investigated the
issue and found irrefutable proof that Philander Knox, then a Cabinet
Secretary, is just as crooked as today's politicians.

*2580*
The sixteenth amendment authorizes the taxation of income "from whatever
source derived" -- thus taking in investment income --"without apportionment
among the several States." The Supreme Court has held that the sixteenth
amendment did not extend the taxing power of the United States to new or
excepted subjects but merely removed the necessity which might otherwise
exist for an apportionment among the States of taxes laid on income whether
it be derived from one source or another. So the amendment made it possible
to bring investment income within the scope of a general income-tax law, but
did not change the character of the tax. It is still fundamentally an
excise or duty with respect to the privilege of carrying on any activity or
owning any property which produces income.

The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measured by
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.
*end 2580*

An excise tax is upon privilege MEASURED by the income the privilege or
privileged activity produces. I said exactly what I meant to say: "the
income tax is an excise tax"

*Logically, what you meant to say was, "IF the income tax is an excise
tax..." which indicates that you believe that SOME income taxes are excises
while OTHERS are direct taxes.*

The income tax IS an excise tax. That makes it a tax in the indirect
category not requiring apportionment.

*That position lies contrary to the holding in Brushaber which said the 16th
Amendment-*

No, it does not.

" It is clear on the face of this text that it does not purport to confer
power to levy income taxes in a generic sense,-an authority already
possessed and never questioned, [240 U.S. 1, 18] -or to limit and
distinguish between one kind of income taxes and another, but that the whole
purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from
apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income was
derived."

In other words, if the source is not considered, ALL income taxes do not
require apportionment. The court made no distinction between income taxes
that were excises and income taxes that were direct taxes. In fact, the
court noted that income taxes had been upheld as indirect taxes in the past.
It was only the erroneous holding in Pollock that any income tax was a
direct tax because they considered the source.*

Let me highlight the one thing I do agree with you on: the holding in
Pollock that the income tax in question was a direct tax was erroneous
because the S.C. considered the source. The tax was upon a corporation's
return on investment. A corporation exists by privilege. A corporation can
be taxed for existing. To tax a human for existing is to levy a direct tax-
this is not the case when taxing a corporation's existence.

*Since the 16th Amendment created no new power of taxation-that is, an
unapportioned direct tax-*

Thank you. We agree on that point.

*and since the 16th Amendment allowed unapportioned taxes directly on
income,*

You have just contradicted yourself again. You say the 16th amendment did
not create a power to levy an unapportioned direct tax and in the same
sentence you say the 16th allowed (gave power to lay) unapportioned taxes
directly on income.

Trimming the above to make the points more stark:
"no new power of --- unapportioned direct tax"
"allowed unapportioned taxes directly"

And your conclusion:

*the only conclusion to draw is INCOME TAXES ARE INHERENTLY INDIRECT TAXES.
No apportionment was ever required.*

I agree with proviso: income EXCISE taxes are inherently indirect taxes.

*For my previously stated reasons, YOU have it backwards. Since the 16th
Amendment, NO income tax requires apportionment.*

Wrong. Since the 16th amendment, income excise taxes are required to stay in
the indirect category and the courts are not allowed to remove those excise
taxes from the indirect category.

*There are not different kinds of income taxes.*

Yes, there is, because there is different kinds of "income".
There is gross income; taxable income; net income; gross receipts; payroll
revenue; return on invested property; the ten bucks you lent your buddy
being repaid; Constitutional, 16th Amendment income (the only income the
16th acts upon.

*All income taxes are in the category of excises and thus do not require
apportionment.*
*IF THE THING BEING TAXED IS INCOME, NO APPORTIONMENT IS REQUIRED IPSO
FACTO.*

Depends upon your definition of income. If you are using the correct
definition, I agree with you. Incorrect definition and I do not agree with
you.

Your post, confusing as you made it, did click the following into my mind.

Brushaber is citing pollock in this paragraph:
Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted for the purpose of
rendering it impossible to burden by taxation accumulations of property,
real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment, it was
held that the duty existed to fix what was a direct tax in the
constitutional sense so as to accomplish this purpose contemplated by the
Constitution.

And the Pollock conclusion as stated in Brushaber is correct except for one
thing I address below:
the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve
holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the
classof direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact
that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced
as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to
accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct
taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to
disregard form and consider substance alone, and hence subject the tax to
the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not
apply to it.

A tax on constitutional income is not a tax on accumulated property. Snow
on the ground is analogous to accumulated property, falling snow is
analogous to constitutional income. A tax on true constitutonal income is
not a tax that the rule of apportionment was designed to prevent.


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C

cpt banjo

Money said:
cptbanjo@aol

**>> Only government "employees" are paid "wages".**


*False. You are misreading the definition of the term "includes".*

[imbecilic gibberish regarding the meaning of "includes" is omitted]
Let's see what the courts have said about Money's argument:

"The other jury instructions proffered by the defendant are equally
inane. Thus we hold that the district court did not err in refusing the
other instruction offered by Latham implying that 26 U.S.C. § 7343
defining "person" does not include natural persons. n2 Similarly,
Latham's instruction which indicated that under 26 U.S.C. § 3401(c)
the category of "employee" does not include privately employed wage
earners is a preposterous reading of the statute. It is obvious that
within the context of both statutes the word "includes" is a term of
enlargement not of limitation, and the reference to certain entities or
categories is not intended to exclude all others.

n2 "The statute's provision was not intended to exclude [individuals]
or to limit the ordinary meaning of the term 'person' so as to exclude
individuals or 'natural persons' . . . from their responsibility to
comply with the tax laws." United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 528
(5th Cir. 1981)."

U.S. v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir. 1985).
**>> Private workers working for private companies do NOT receive wages as
statutorily defined...**


*Yes, they do.*

LOL.
Take it up with the courts, NONE of which have bought your nonsensical
claims.
The court is wrong in the case you cited for the same reason the court iswrong in the recent Kelo case.
So you think the Bromley court was wrong. Big deal. It's still the
law, whether you agree with it or not.
Even if you and the court were correct on this issue, you still need to state what "right incident to
property ownership" is being taxed by the income "excise" tax.
The acquisition of income.
I don't need to.
Translation: I can't.>
That's not the only way. I can post questions with self-evident answers.
Translation: I know there are no cases upholding my position -- that's
why I can't cite any.

Is taking of property of a natural person against that person's will and without that person's permission
THEFT?
Not necessarily.
Is a purpose of government to protect property and rights to property? Ifa government that is supposed
to protect property and rights to property in stead TAKES the property ofa natural person against that
person's will and without that person's permission, is that government violating its purpose?
Not if it does it in accordance with its constitutional power to tax.
You're a true believer in the goodness of government. Just like the German truck driver delivering Zyklon-
B to the camps.
To use your phrase, your admission that you don't have the requisite
skills to debate intelligently is noted.
Dale Eastman's claims are pathetic TP bilge. I figured you are either
Eastman or that you have swallowed the koolaid he peddles, since all of
your inane postings are nothing more than cut and paste jobs from
Eastman's absurd arguments
 
E

esenter

Money said:
*Since the 16th Amendment created no new power of taxation-that is, an
unapportioned direct tax-*

Thank you. We agree on that point.

*and since the 16th Amendment allowed unapportioned taxes directly on
income,*

You have just contradicted yourself again. You say the 16th amendment did
not create a power to levy an unapportioned direct tax and in the same
sentence you say the 16th allowed (gave power to lay) unapportioned taxes
directly on income.
It is not a contradiction. Only if you ASSUME a "direct tax" is any tax
laid "directly" on something, that is, identifying the economic burden
whence the tax lays, you are committing the same error as the Pollock
court. Read the dissenting opinion in Pollock on rehearing by J.White.
Since Hylton, the ONLY direct taxes are those laid on land, or other
property because of ownership, and capitations. Since the 16th
Amendment, ALL taxes laid directly on income are indirect taxes.

Trimming the above to make the points more stark:
"no new power of --- unapportioned direct tax"
"allowed unapportioned taxes directly"

And your conclusion:

*the only conclusion to draw is INCOME TAXES ARE INHERENTLY INDIRECT TAXES.
No apportionment was ever required.*

I agree with proviso: income EXCISE taxes are inherently indirect taxes.

*For my previously stated reasons, YOU have it backwards. Since the 16th
Amendment, NO income tax requires apportionment.*

Wrong. Since the 16th amendment, income excise taxes are required to stay in
the indirect category and the courts are not allowed to remove those excise
taxes from the indirect category.

*There are not different kinds of income taxes.*

Yes, there is, because there is different kinds of "income".
There is gross income; taxable income; net income; gross receipts; payroll
revenue; return on invested property; the ten bucks you lent your buddy
being repaid; Constitutional, 16th Amendment income (the only income the
16th acts upon.

*All income taxes are in the category of excises and thus do not require
apportionment.*
*IF THE THING BEING TAXED IS INCOME, NO APPORTIONMENT IS REQUIRED IPSO
FACTO.*

Depends upon your definition of income. If you are using the correct
definition, I agree with you. Incorrect definition and I do not agree with
you.
GOTCHA...
"income is the GAIN DERIVED from capital, from labor, or from both
combined." Stratton's Independence. As you can see, that is NOT
limited to only corporate profit. The average working stiff can have
income by that definition.


Your post, confusing as you made it, did click the following into my mind.

Brushaber is citing pollock in this paragraph:
Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted for the purpose of
rendering it impossible to burden by taxation accumulations of property,
real or personal, except subject to the regulation of apportionment, it was
held that the duty existed to fix what was a direct tax in the
constitutional sense so as to accomplish this purpose contemplated by the
Constitution.

And the Pollock conclusion as stated in Brushaber is correct except for one
thing I address below:
the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve
holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the
classof direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact
that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced
as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to
accomplishing the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct
taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise to
disregard form and consider substance alone, and hence subject the tax to
the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not
apply to it.

A tax on constitutional income is not a tax on accumulated property. Snow
on the ground is analogous to accumulated property, falling snow is
analogous to constitutional income. A tax on true constitutonal income is
not a tax that the rule of apportionment was designed to prevent.
Yep, constitutional income is analogous to the falling snow. It is the
INCREASE to the accumulation and not the accumulation itself. By that
definition, any working stiff has constitutional income when he gets
paid for producing anything with his labor.
 
S

Shyster1040

Re: "Money"'s screed on interpreting Sec. 7701(c):

You're not too bright, are you? The canons of statutory construction you
brandish about like a blunder-buss are only that, canons of construction,
rules of thumb that courts apply sparingly and then only if the intent of
the statute under examination is otherwise not clear, and other means of
clarification do not help.

In this case, the intent of the statute, which can only be fathomed within
the context of the overall statutory frame-work within which it exists,
makes the intent of the particular provision that's got your panties in a
twist crystal clear - "employee" means not only every person who falls
within the meaning of that term in common ordinary usage (i.e., the
dictionary definition) but also expressly includes persons who work for
governmental entities.

This provision was necessary because, under the common-law, it was not
always the case that a person who performed services for the government
constituted a common-law "employee." As a matter of current practice,
under U.S. common-law this distinction has, by now, mostly faded; however,
at the time that the original withholding provisions were drafted, the
issue of whether a public officer was also a common-law "employee" was
more of a live issue. Congress may often look like a bunch of second-rate
keystone cops, but when it comes to making sure the tax laws cover whom
they intend such laws to cover, they're no slouches. The references in a
variety of employment-related provisions in the Code that "include"
corporate officers and government workers within the class of "employees"
was intentionally done to ensure that (a) the taxability of such a person
did not depend on what state that person lived in and whether that state's
common-law did, or did not, include government officials as "employees"
and (b) to prevent an end-run around the rule by having a state
unilaterally declare by statute that the term "employee" did not include a
government official (which the states, being very large employers, would
be tempted to do in order to avoid having to withhold FICA, FUTA, and
income tax).

To see what this distinction looked like under the old common-law, it
helps to look at some older English precedents (that is, after all, whence
commeth American common-law). For example, the Australian Tax Office
(which often has to deal with parallel issues in a constitutional legal
frame-work based in large part on the US model, but with substantial
interpretive deviations, and with a closer adherence to old English
common-law precedent) has prepared at least one memorandum that discusses
some of these issues. See, e.g., ATO Tax Ruling TR 2002/21, NO
2002/009477, "Income tax: Pay As You Go (PAYG) Withholding from salary,
wages, commissions, bonuses or allowances paid to office holders"
(effective for payments made after 1 July 2000).

TR 2002/21 can be found online at:
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=TXR/TR200221/NAT/ATO/00001

As a quick review of the case-law precedents cited by TR 2002/21 shows,
that authority goes back several centuries and, furthermore, that it is
still a live issue into the late 1900s insofar as the Australian tax
system is concerned.

The essential point is that, under English common-law, as incorporated
into both the Commonwealth of Australia and the United States, certain
types of public officers were not considered to be "employees" and, in
addition, that certain officers of corporations were also not considered
to be "employees" more from the nature of the position held rather than,
strictly speaking, the nature of the activities conducted. Thus, it was
entirely possible under the English common-law for a person who otherwise
performed personal services indistinguishable from those performed by
people who were clearly "employees" to be treated as not being employees
because of the nature of the office they held or the manner of their
appointment.

With a little more in-depth reading, you will also realize that the
Australians have come to the same solution, namely, expressly including
such people within the term "employee" for purposes of their income tax
withholding regime.

That, in a nut-shell, is why Sec. 3401(c) provides that the term
"employee" includes public officials, elected and not, as well as officers
of corporations. Absent such a statutory provision, there would be a
strong chance that many state-government officials and corporate officers
would not be subject to wage withholding, or to the payroll taxes, whereas
a similarly situated person who provided substantially the same services
to a private employer was subject to income tax withholding and payroll
taxes.

So, as should be blatantly obvious to anyone other than a liar or a cheat
at this point, the purpose for expressly providing in Section 3401(c) that
the term "employee" includes government officials and corporate officers
was not to limit the reach of those sections only to government officials
and corporate officers, but was to make sure that the term "employment"
necessarily included those people along with everyone else that it already
included under the common-law.

Having divined the obvious purpose of the statute with reference to the
purpose for which the overall statutory frame-work was enacted (the
collection of payments for services rendered at source) and the specific
common-law issues that the statutory provision in question was intended to
overrule (the uncertainty about whether or not public officials or
corporate officers constituted "employees" under the common-law), the fact
that, under the other canons of statutory construction, if Congress had
intended to limit the term "employee" solely to government officials and
corporate officers, Section 3401(c) would have been drafted so that it
read "For purposes of this chapter, the term "employee" means ...." - the
word "means" is a word of limitation under normal statutory and contract
interpretation canons, and finally, the fact that the canon of
interpretation that an enumeration of some implicitly excludes the rest is
to be sparingly applied and does not actually apply in this case because
we have already divined the purpose of the statute from other, more
reliable, means, your proposition that Section 3401(c) only includes
government officials and corporate officers is patently ridiculous, and
you fully deserve to have the full measure of any penalty for frivolous
arguments thrown in your face if you try to make this argument to the IRS
or the courts.

In short, to paraphrase Wolfgang Pauli (the physicist), your theory is so
bad it's not even wrong.
 
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J

Jimmy_For_Freedom

Abbot said:
Abbot) Jimmy *has* no argument.
Money has a good point. Lest I become one of you, I'll continue to
stick to the facts - facts which you would dearly love to hide. You
know - the ones you refer to as "bad Jokes"? Care to fess up and
explain yourself?


MoRon's veiled claim that U.S. income tax may not be applied to wages,
salary, compensation for labor or whatever he is calling "it" today is
a long age refuted point with no basis in law.
At the end of that thread of bickering, Shyster1040@nospamhotmail puts his
$1.25 in.

*This is a bit of a silly debate. As inferior officers of the federal
government, revenue agents are duty-bound to follow the Constitution. It
follows, then, that a revenue officer does not have the power or the right
to ignore the Constitution.*

Can I quote you on that Shyster1040? Nevermind, I am quoting you on that.
The question to be answered is, "Will you stick to that position when it
works to your disadvantage?" That's rhetorical, your other answers will
supply the answer to that question.

*However, the precise dictates of the Constitution are not always crystal
clear, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison. Thus, it is always possible thata
revenue agent, acting in good-faith, may nonetheless transgress the
Constitution. That is why we have the courts and the doctrine of judicial
review; the courts exist, in part, to provide a means to peacefully correct
any inadvertent transgression of the Constitution.*

The Constitution, and the government it embodies exist for three reasons,
and three reasons ONLY.
1. Protect Life.
2. Protect Liberty.
3. Protect Property.

I do not need a court, or a doctrine of judicial review to understand when
any of those three rights of a NATURAL PERSON, (a Citizen) are transgressed.
The manufactured reality of TVLAND has robbed the good Citizens of America
of their common sense on those three issues. The Supreme Court was WRONG on
the Kelo decision. They VIOLATED the rights of Liberty and Property of Kelo.
Since this is a side note, I'm done with it.

*Inadvertant transgression of the Constitution*. It's no longer
*inadvertant* if I inform you, Mr. IRS Agent, that if you continue to
attempt to collect a tax the law does not say I owe, you are violating my
UNALIENABLE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

And I AM INFORMING YOU, MR. IRS AGENT, the 16th Amendment does NOT ALLOW A
DIRECT-UNAPPORTIONED TAX on anything. (But then Shyster1040 knows this
because he chose to ignore me and my reply to his reply to my post.)

*However, an officer of the federal government is, in general, presumedto
have acted within the dictates of the Constitution unless an aggrieved
person demonstrates otherwise.*

That demonstration can be shown if need be.

2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222

3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
Shyster1040@nospamhotmail puts his $0.15 in.

*Umm... United States Code, Title 26, Subtitle A, Chapter 1, SubchapterA,
Part I, Section 1, to wit: "(a) There is hereby imposed on the taxable
income of -- (1) [every married individual], and (2) [every surviving
spouse], a tax determined in accordance with the following table: ...."
It continues, ad nauseam, so I won't quote you the entire thing.

That enough?*

No.
3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333

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(e-mail address removed) says:

*The Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, Part II.*

Minor point, it's "Section II".

Page header:
*166 SIXTY-THIRD CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch. 16. 1913

Section II.:
A. Subdivision 1. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid
annually upon the entire net income arising of accruing from all sources in
the preceding calendar year to every citizen of the United States, whether
residing at home or abroad, and to every person residing in the United
States, though not a citizen thereof, a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon
such income, except as hereinafter provided; and a like tax shall be
assesed, levied, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income
from all property owned and of every business, trade, or profession carried
on in the United States by PERSONS RESIDING ELSEWHERE.*

It is interesting that the margin notes of the above paragraph state: *One
per cent levied on net incomes of citizens*, *Alien residents*,
*Nonresidents*
As of the date of this law, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the meaning
of income.


*Of course it did not place an unapportioned direct tax as the Income Tax is
clearly an indirect tax since the XVI Amendment seperated income from
sources. *

Which "indirect" tax would that be? A duty? An impost? An excise?

American Airways v. Wallace, 57 F.2d 877, 880:
*The term 'excise tax' and 'privilege tax' are synonymous. The two are often
used interchangeably.*

Here's the Cook's summary of Pollock:
*In particular, a tax imposed on the income derived from employment is an
excise tax levied on the "privilege" of exercising the particular profession
from which the income was derived.*

Page 2580 of the House Congressional Record dated March 27, 1943:
The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measuredby
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.

|\\ a tax on income from labor was always regarded as an indirect tax in the
nature of an excise [PRIVILEGE] tax |\\

Name the privilege.
"______________________________________________"


*Another error, there is no business activity in the Supreme Court
definition:*

(e-mail address removed) is correct on this issue but not if one only looksat
the Supreme Court cases of Flint v. Stone Tracy, 220 U.S. 107 (1911);
Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); and; Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918), all of which deal with the 1909 tax
act, in which the income tax was ONLY UPON CORPORATE PROFIT.

This is proven with an excerpt of Page 2580 House Congressional Record March
27, 1943:

*That investment income may be included as a part of the basis for measuring
an excise tax was recognized by Congress in the act of August 5, 1909. This
act provided, "That every corporation --- shall be subject to pay annually a
special excise tax with respect to the carrying on of doing business bysuch
corporation, --- equivalent to a 1 percent upon the entire net income over
and above $5,000 received by it from all sources during such year, exclusive
of amounts received by it as dividends upon stock and other corporations ---
subject to the tax hereby imposed; ---." Certain corporations, such as
religious, charitable, and educational organizations, etc., were
specifically exempted from the tax.

The tax imposed by this act was really an income tax in that it was based
upon net income, but was given the correct designation of "excise tax".It
was imposed with respect to carrying on or doing business; and it should be
noted that the basis was net income from all sources, except dividends from
other corporations subject to the tax. Such dividends were excepted not
because they constituted investment income but because they represented
income which had already been taxed. The sole test of taxability underthis
act was whether a corporation was engaged in business. If it was so
engaged, then all the income (except dividends), including investment
income, was used in measuring the tax.*

(e-mail address removed) needs to publicly admit that in the cases of Flintv.
Stone Tracy; Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert; and; Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co. the "income" tax WAS SOLELY UPON CORPORATE PROFITS.

(e-mail address removed) states:
*Another error, there is no business activity in the Supreme Court
definition:*

Then (e-mail address removed) cites the MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST CO. v. SMIETANKA
case.

*The question is one of definition, and the answer to it may be found in
recent decisions of this Court.

The Corporation Excise Tax Act of August 5, 1909 (36 Stat. 11, 112), was
not an income tax law, but a definition of the word 'income' was so
necessary in its administration that in an early case it was formulatedas
'A gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.'
Stratton's Independence v. Howbert*

(e-mail address removed) fails to cite the rest of the MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST
CO. v. SMIETANKA case.

*It is obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the
word 'income' has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had
in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of
meaning was in effect decided in Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, where itwas
assumed for the purposes of decision that there was no difference in its
meaning as used in the act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913. There
can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and content in
the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the act of 1913.

When to this we add that in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, a case arising under
the same Income Tax Act of 1916 which is here involved, the definition of
'income' which was applied was adopted from Stratton's Independence v.
Howbert, supra, arising under the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, with
the addition that it should include 'profit gained through sale or
conversion of capital assets,' there would seem to be no room to doubt that
the word must be given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of
Congress that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that
what that meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this
Court.*

[T]here would seem to be no room to doubt that the word [income] must be
given the same meaning in all of the Income Tax Acts of Congress that was
given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act [of 1909], and that whatthat
meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.

*In determining the definition of the word 'income' thus arrived at, this
Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of
lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the definitions quoted,
what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which
must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers Co., Eisner v.
Macomber. *

From the above paragraphs cited of Merchants', the definition of income
arises from the *Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909* which does indeed tax
corporate profit solely.


Yet (e-mail address removed) is correct in regard to the meaning of income not
being solely corporate profits. This leaves an appearance of a paradox, (A
seemingly contradictory statement that may nonetheless be true). Thereis
ONLY ONE WAY for both statements to be true.

Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co. 271 U.S. 170 (1926)
*'Income' has been taken to mean the same thing as used in the Corporation
Excise Tax Act of 1909, in the Sixteenth Amendment, and in the various
revenue acts subsequently passed. Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe; Merchants'
L. & T. Co. v. Smietanka.*

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
*This case presents the question whether, by virtue of the Sixteenth
Amendment, Congress has the power to tax, as income of the stockholder and
without apportionment, a stock dividend made lawfully and in good faith
against profits accumulated by the corporation since March 1, 1913.*

This case raises an issue of just what is the meaning of income in the
Sixteenth Amendment.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
*In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the
Constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified bythe
amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect, it becomes
essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,' as the
term is there used, and to apply the distinction, as cases arise, according
to truth and substance, without regard to form.*

Parse for clarity:
*In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article 1 of the
Constitution* (direct taxes must be apportioned) *may have proper forceand
effect, save only as modified by the amendment* (power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment) *it
becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not 'income,'
as the term is there used...*

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)
*For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the term
'income,' as used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the
amendment, and, having formed also a correct judgment as to the nature of a
stock dividend, we shall find it easy to decide the matter at issue.

After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard Dict.;
Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to add to the
succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax
Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros.
Co.), 'Income may be defined as the GAIN DERIVED from capital, from labor,
or from both combined,' provided it be understood to include PROFIT gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was appliedin
the Doyle Case.

Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing attribute
of income essential for a correct solution of the present controversy. The
government, although basing its argument upon the definition as quoted,
placed chief emphasis upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a
variety of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived. 'DERIVED-FROM-CAPITAL'; 'the
GAIN-DERIVED-FROM-CAPITAL,' etc.

Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital; not a
growth or increment of value in the investment; but a GAIN, a PROFIT,
something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the property, SEVERED FROM
THE CAPITAL, HOWEVER INVESTED OR EMPLOYED, and coming in, being
'derived'-that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his
separate use, benefit and disposal- THAT IS INCOME DERIVED FROM PROPERTY.
NOTHING ELSE ANSWERS THE DESCRIPTION.*

The "description" itself can only be described as "Return on Investment".

Returning to MERCHANTS' LOAN & TRUST CO. v. SMIETANKA to tie up some loose
ends:
*In determining the definition of the word 'income' thus arrived at, this
Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of
lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the definitions quoted,
what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which
must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.*

*Income
3. That gain which proceeds from labor, business, property, or capital of
any kind, as the produce of a farm, the rent of houses, the proceeds of
professional business, the PROFITS of commerce or of occupation, or THE
INTEREST OF MONEY OR STOCK IN FUNDS, etc.; revenue; receipts; salary;
ESPECIALLY, THE ANNUAL RECEIPTS OF A PRIVATE PERSON, OR A CORPORATION, FROM
PROPERTY, AS, A LARGE INCOME.
Webster's Dictionary 1913 edition (Page: 745)*

*Income
6. That which comes in to a person as payment for labor or services rendered
in some office, or as a GAIN FROM LANDS, BUSINESS, THE INVESTMENT OF
CAPITAL, etc.; receipts or emoluments regularly accruing, either in a given
time, or, when unqualified, annually; the annual receipts of a person or a
corporation; revenue: as, an income of five thousand dollars; his income has
been reduced the income from the business is small.
Synonym. Income, Revenue, Value, PROFIT. Revenue is the income of a
government or state, without reverence to expenditures; PROFIT IS THE GAIN
MADE UPON ANY BUSINESS OR INVESTMENT WHEN BOTH THE RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. Property may have value and yield neither income nor
profit.
Century Dictionary Online 1913? edition*

In the back of my mind is the thought that somewhere on the internet, Iread
something about how the tax and the amendment was promoted as a "soak the
rich" scheme. The rich would be those who lived off of the "return" from
their "investments" either as interest payments, or dividend payments not
having to lift a finger to do manual labor. If true, this decidedly tips
the balance of what is meant by "income" to "Return on Investment" also
called "profit".

*profit
"Specifically, the advantage or GAIN RESULTING TO THE OWNER OF CAPITAL FROM
ITS EMPLOYMENT in any undertaking"; "As used in political economy, profit
means what is left of the product of industry after deducting the wages, the
price of raw materials, and the rent paid in the production, and is
considered as being composed of three parts-- interest, risk or insurance,
and wages of superintendence."
Century Dictionary Online 1913? edition*

The Century Dictionary Online under the definition of "profit" (shown above)
has these examples:

*profit
"THE REVENUE derived from labour is called wages; that DERIVED FROM STOCK,
BY THE PERSON WHO manages or EMPLOYES IT, IS CALLED PROFIT. Adam Smith,
Wealth of Nations, 1.7.";
Century Dictionary Online 1913? edition*

*prof·it n. 2. THE RETURN RECEIVED ON A BUSINESS UNDERTAKING after all
operating expenses have been met. 3. Often profits. a. THE RETURN RECEIVED
ON AN INVESTMENT after all charges have been paid. b. The rate of increase
in the net worth of a business enterprise in a given accounting period.c.
Income received from investments or property. d. The amount received for a
commodity or service in excess of the original cost.
American Heritage Electronic Dictionary*

(e-mail address removed) asserts:
*The entire Court syatem has always ruled that wages and salaries are
taxable by an Income Tax as an indirect tax, see Pollack where it says that
if only the tax on income from property was struck down, it would leavethe
burden to be carried by trades and employments. *

American Airways v. Wallace, 57 F.2d 877, 880:
*The term 'excise tax' and 'privilege tax' are synonymous. The two are often
used interchangeably.*

Here's the Cook's summary of Pollock:
*In particular, a tax imposed on the income derived from employment is an
excise tax levied on the "privilege" of exercising the particular profession
from which the income was derived.*

Page 2580 of the House Congressional Record dated March 27, 1943:
The income tax is, therefor, not a tax on income as such, It is an excise
tax with respect to certain activities and privileges which is measuredby
reference to the income they produce. The income is not the subject of the
tax: it is the basis for determining the amount of tax.

|\\ a tax on income from labor was always regarded as an indirect tax in the
nature of an excise [PRIVILEGE] tax |\\

Name the privilege.
"______________________________________________"


4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444

5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555
Shyster1040@nospamhotmail:
*The only taxes that were considered direct taxes for
purposes of the Constitution were ad-valorem taxes on the value of
property (property taxes), and head, or poll, taxes on persons (taxes
imposed on a person solely for being a person); Pollock, Brushaber, et
cetera.*

*Indeed, from another point of view, the Amendment demonstrates that nosuch
purpose was intended, and on the contrary shows that IT WAS DRAWN WITH THE
OBJECT OF MAINTAINING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION and harmonizing
their operation.

We say this because it is to be observed that although from the date ofthe
Hylton Case, because of statements made in the opinions in that case, it had
come to be accepted that direct taxes in the constitutional sense were
confined to taxes levied directly on real estate because of its ownership,
THE AMENDMENT CONTAINS NOTHING REPUDIATION (rupudiating) OR CHALLENGINGTHE
RULING IN THE POLLOCK CASE THAT THE WORD 'DIRECT' HAD A BROADER
SIGNIFICANCE, SINCE IT EMBRACED ALSO TAXES LEVIED ON PERSONAL PROPERTY
BECAUSE OF ITS OWNERSHIP, AND THEREFORE THE AMENDMENT AT LEAST IMPLIEDLY
MAKES SUCH WIDER SIGNIFICANCE PART OF THE CONSTITUTION, --- *

5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555

6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666

(e-mail address removed)
*Where is the Commissioner delegated authority to administer the Federal
income tax? Pursuant to TDO 150-01 dated February 27, 1986, the
Commissioner is delegated the following authority by item no. 6:
TDO 150-01 dated February 27, 1986
6. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions. The Commissioner shall, to
the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the
administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S.
territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world.

Find a document that delegates authority for the Commissioner to administer
the internal revenue laws within the several States. *

Well? Show us the document, rmacdonald@verizon.
Well? Show us the document, Shyster1040@nospamhotmail

6666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666

7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777

(e-mail address removed)
*Where is the Commissioner delegated authority to administer the Federal
income tax? Pursuant to TDO 150-01 dated February 27, 1986, the
Commissioner is delegated the following authority by item no. 6:
TDO 150-01 dated February 27, 1986
6. U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions. The Commissioner shall, to
the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the
administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the U.S.
territories and insular possessions and other authorized areas of the world.

Find a document that delegates authority for the Commissioner to administer
the internal revenue laws within the several States. *

Shyster1040@nospamhotmail
*Try reading Code Section 7803, specifically Code Section 7803(a)(2), which
provides for the duties of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Code
Section 7803(a)(1) provides that "[t]here shall be in the Department of
the Treasury a Commissioner of Internal Revenue ....").

Code Section 7803(a)(2) provides that the Commissioner shall have such
duties as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, including the power
to "administer, manage, conduct, direct, and supervise the execution and
application of the internal revenue laws or related statutes and tax
conventions to which the United States is a party...." Code Section
7803(a)(2)(A).

Most importantly, the flush language of Code Section 7803(a)(2) following
Code Section 7803(a)(2)(B) provides that "f the Secretary determines
not to delegate a power specified in subparagraph (A) or (B), such
determination may not take effect until 30 days after the Secretary
notifies the Committees on Ways and Means, Government Reform and
Oversight, and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Committees on Finance, Governmental Affairs, and Appropriations of the
Senate." The Committee report concerning Code Section 7803 provides that
the Commissioner "has such duties and powers as prescribed by the
Secretary. Unless otherwise specified by the Secretary, such duties and
powers include the power to administer, manage, conduct, direct, and
supervise the execution and application of the internal revenue laws or
related statutes and tax conventions to which the United States is a
party, to exercise the IRS' final authority concerning the substantive
interpretation of the tax laws, ...."*

TITLE 5 - GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
PART I - THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
CHAPTER 5 - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SUBCHAPTER II - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

-HEAD-
Sec. 552. Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders,
records, and proceedings

-STATUTE-
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as
follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in
the Federal Register for the guidance of the public -
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as
authorized by law, and statements of general policy or
interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted
by the agency; ---

TITLE 5 - GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
PART I - THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
CHAPTER 5 - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SUBCHAPTER II - ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

-HEAD-
Sec. 551. Definitions

-STATUTE-
For the purpose of this subchapter -
(1) ''agency'' means each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review
by another agency, but does not include -
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the
United States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia; ---

(4) ''rule'' means the whole or a part of an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed
to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy ---

http://www.atgpress.com/atgpress/tax/tax007.htm
*One of the curious authorities in paragraph 6, which is the chief authority
IRS hangs its hat on, is T.O. 150-10, which in 1982 succeeded 150-37.
Neither of these basic delegations of authority were ever published in the
Federal Register in compliance with requirements of 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a).
Therefore, application is limited to government under authority of 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 and territorial jurisdiction in insular possessions, maritime and
treaty jurisdictions, the latter three exempt from Federal Register Act
publishing requirements.*

TITLE 44 - PUBLIC PRINTING AND DOCUMENTS
CHAPTER 15 - FEDERAL REGISTER AND CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

-HEAD-
Sec. 1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register

-STATUTE-
(a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; Documents Having General
Applicability and Legal Effect; Documents Required To Be Published
by Congress. There shall be published in the Federal Register -
(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except
those not having general applicability and legal effect or
effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their
capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof;
(2) documents or classes of documents that the President may
determine from time to time have general applicability and legal
effect; and
(3) documents or classes of documents that may be required so
to be published by Act of Congress.
For the purposes of this chapter every document or order which
prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect.

TITLE 5 - GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES
PART I - THE AGENCIES GENERALLY
CHAPTER 3 - POWERS

-HEAD-
Sec. 301. Departmental regulations

-STATUTE-
The head of an Executive department or military department may
prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the
conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its
business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records,
papers, and property. This section does not authorize withholding
information from the public or limiting the availability of records
to the public.


That Delegation of Authority from the Secretary of Treasury to the
Commissioner of the IRS is published on what page of the Federal Register?

7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777
 

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